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ENDANGERED SPECIES, AND THE
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PATRICK A. PARENTEAU*
T his Article will examine the claim that government regulation of
private property for the conservation of endangered species under
the federal Endangered Species Act of 1973 ("ESA")' triggers a "tak-
ing" requiring just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. The
concept of "regulatory takings" originated more than seventy years
ago in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,2 with Justice Holmes' oft-
quoted statement that government restrictions become takings when
they go "too far."' 3 Since then, the United States Supreme Court and
lower courts have struggled to develop coherent, predictable regula-
tory takings jurisprudence. The Court has undergone several transfor-
mations in its interpretation of the takings issue. For a long while, the
Court upheld the exercise of the police power with little regard for
economic impacts on private property, and granted nearly complete
deference to legislative pronouncements of the public good.' Then
the Court entered an avoidance phase, declining to determine takings
challenges on the grounds that they were not ripe, that administrative
remedies had not been exhausted, or that the record was incomplete. 5
Eventually, however, the social and political landscape began to
change, the regulatory state continued to grow, and conservatives re-
placed liberals on the Court. In this climate, the Supreme Court's reg-
ulatory takings jurisprudence began to reflect greater concern for the
interests of property owners. Gradually, the Court began to move
away from the multi-factor, highly deferential balancing test of Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,6 towards a single-factor,
categorical approach. This transformation started with the "physical
invasion" cases, such as Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
* Director, Environmental Law Center, Vermont Law School.
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
3. Id. at 415.
4. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (rock quarry); Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (cedar trees); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (brickyard); Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (brewery). See generally REGULATORY TAKING (G.
Richard Hill ed., 1990) [hereinafter REGULATORY TAKING].
5. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); William-
son County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
6. 438 U.S. 104, 123-25 (1978).
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Corp.,7 and reached another milestone with the "total takings" rule of
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.8
Three cases exemplify the Court's movement towards greater pro-
tection of private property rights. In Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission,9 the Court struck down a permit condition requiring the
owner to grant public access to the beach in exchange for permission
to rebuild his bungalow.'" Nollan signalled stricter scrutiny of the
nexus between regulatory means and ends. In Lucas, the Court held
that a regulation denying a property owner all economically feasible
use of his property was a per se taking unless the restricted use was
not within the bundle of property rights to begin with-for example, a
common law nuisance." Lucas narrowed the "noxious use" exception
to takings and created a presumptive right to compensation when the
regulation completely destroyed reasonable, investment-backed ex-
pectations.1 2 Two years later, in Dolan v. City of Tigard,3 the Court
invalidated land use exactions requiring the owner to dedicate a por-
tion of her property as a greenway and bicycle path to help offset
flooding and traffic congestion.' 4 Dolan announced a new "rough
proportionality" test for determining the reasonableness of land use
controls in relation to the impacts of specific developments.'5
The Federal Circuit, overseeing the Federal Court of Claims, has
gone further than the Supreme Court, finding takings in a number of
wetland cases, most notably Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States 6
and Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States.17 In Loveladies
Harbor, the Federal Circuit upheld a $1 million award to a New Jersey
developer who was denied a permit under the Clean Water Act 8 to
fill 11.5 acres of wetlands out of an original 250-acre tract.19 By ex-
cluding the eighty percent of the parcel that had already been devel-
oped, on the ground that it was purchased before the wetlands
regulations came into force, the Federal Circuit sought to distinguish
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis,2 ° which requires
that the "property as a whole" must be evaluated when determining
7. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
8. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2895 (1992).
9. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
10. Id. at 842.
11. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02.
12. Id.
13. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2319-20.
16. 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), reh'g denied, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
28462 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 29, 1994).
17. 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
19. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1182-83.,
20. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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the economic impact of regulation on only a portion of the entire
property.21
The issue in Florida Rock is more controversial than that consid-
ered in Loveladies Harbor. In Florida Rock, the court proposed a
"partial takings" test that would compensate landowners when the
government action results in a substantial, but not total, diminution in
the value of the affected property.22 The Federal Circuit has also ex-
tended the scope of the physical invasion principle to hold that the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") committed a taking when
it installed a groundwater monitoring well on private property as part
of a Superfund cleanup operation.23
Clearly, these judicial developments have been hailed by property
rights advocates across the land., Recent political developments, the
new Republican majority in Congress, and the "Contract with
America," which would require, compensation for rules that reduce
property value by even ten percent, indicate that the anti-government
forces are gaining strength. The ESA is a priority on a targeted list of
environmental laws under evaluation by the 104th Congress. To
some, the ESA is the very essence of environmental excess and gov-
ernment abuse.
I come to praise the ESA, not to bury it. It is the most important
environmental statute enacted, posing the fundamental question of
whether humans can, to paraphrase the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act ("NEPA"), 2 4 live in productive harmony with nature. Put
more bluntly, are humans intelligent enough to understand that with-
out other species humanity itself will not survive? Whereas NEPA
simply declares aspirational goals, the ESA actually demands the
achievement of those goals. Indeed, the ESA has a bottom line: spe-
cies extinction must be avoided "whatever the Cost."'2 5 The publica-
tion of lists of threatened and endangered species26 permits the ESA
to continually track extinction trends of all flora and fauna. The cur-
rent lists contain nearly 700 domestic species, and another 3000 to
4000 are considered "candidates" for listing.27 Presently, scientists es-
timate that the worldwide rate of extinction is 1000 species per year.28
Analogous to the lifesaving function of the "miner's canary," the
plight of each imperiled species issues a similar warning. The precipi-
21. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1180-81.
22. Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1567.
23. Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4370(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
25. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172 (1978).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a).
27. Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the
U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 277, 285 (1993); see
also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES Acr: TYPES AND
NUMBER OF IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS (1992).
28. EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE (1992).
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tous decline in the bald eagle population warned about the devastat-
ing effects of the continuing use of toxic pesticides on the food chain.
The endangerment of the frequently maligned snail darter warned
against squandering free-flowing rivers, valuable riparian habitat, and
prime farmland in deference to meaningless water projects. The
highly controversial and deeply devisive issue of the survival of the
spotted owl demonstrated that unsustainable forestry practices on the
public and private lands of the Northwest threatened not only ecosys-
tems, but also jobs and communities. Finally, difficult decisions in-
clude balancing priorities. For example, the chinook and sockeye
salmon in the Snake River, once a great anadromous salmon resouirce
of the Columbia River System, are being sacrificed for the "cheap"
power generated by federally operated or licensed hydro-dams.29
Unfortunately, critical warnings frequently go unheeded. Today,
the public lands continue to be over-grazed .and water supply aquifers
continue to be over-pumped. Fisheries are over-harvested, wetlands
are drained and filled, and estuaries are being contaminated. In short,
ecosystems continue to fragment and decay across the landscape.
Contrary to Rush Limbaugh and the editors of the Wall Street Jour-
nal, the ESA does not threaten the economic security or liberty of the
Union. In fact, every sober investigation of the ESA has demon-
strated that its regulatory requirements have been satisfied without
significant conflict.3" Of the thousands of "consultations" that have
occurred under section 7, only a handful have become cause celebres
of the conservative talk show circuit. Although modifications are re-
quired to avoid or reduce harm to protected species which may be
time-consuming and expensive, facts do not support those who claim
the ESA is stifling progress, or confiscating private property. In real-
ity, there has never been a successful takings case brought against the
ESA in the two decades it has been in operation.3' Claims have been
filed, of course, and more are on the way, but as the following discus-
sion will demonstrate, there is little reason to fear a broadscale consti-
tutional attack on the ESA.
The initial point is that the ESA contains provisions that can be
utilized to avoid constitutional showdowns. For instance, in the case
of threatened species, section 4(d) authorizes the Secretary of the In-
terior to promulgate a "special rule" allowing some impact on the spe-
cies in exchange for an agreement among affected landowners to enter
into a regional conservation plan.31 One of the most celebrated cases
29. Although there are many causes of the salmon crisis, for example, habitat loss,
overharvest, and hatchery problems, the hydropower system causes 80% of the mor-
tality. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp.
886 (D. Or. 1994).
30. Houck, supra note 27, at 289.
31. Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are: The Endangered Species Act and
Private Property, 24 ENVrL. L. 369, 385 (1994).
32. 16 U.S.C. § 1534(d) (1988); 50 C.F.R. § 13 (1989).
ENDANGERED SPECIES
involves the California gnatcatcher whose rapidly disappearing coastal
sage-scrub habitat just happens to be located in some of the most val-
uable real estate in Southern California.33 When the gnatcatcher was
listed as a threatened species in 1993, Secretary of the Interior Bruce
Babbitt promulgated a special rule providing regulatory relief for de-
velopers who participated in California's Natural Communities Con-
servation Planning Program ("NCCP"), an ongoing effort to develop a
multi-species, regional habitat conservation plan to be funded with
public and private funds.' Although obstacles remain, the NCCP has
mustered sufficient support, enabling it to achieve significant results.
Another potential source of relief from constitutional challenges is
section 10(a), which provides for an incidental take permit ("ITP")
based on an approvable Habitat Conservation Plan ("HCP"). An ITP
allows land development activities that would otherwise be prohibited
as an unlawful "taking" under section 9 of the ESA.35 To increase
participation in the HCP process,36 Secretary Babbitt has taken steps
to make the HCP process more predictable and "user friendly." One
of his first initiatives was to create the National Biological Survey,
since renamed the National Biological Service, to create an inventory
of biological resources modeled after the U.S. Geological Survey.
Secretary Babbitt hoped to avoid the need for heroic measures to res-
cue declining species, by improving the data base for declining species
and taking preventative action. Additionally, Secretary Babbitt's pol-
icy commits the government to honor the original terms of HCPs even
if circumstances change. For example, if newly listed species are dis-
covered on the permittee's land, the HCP will not be amended to in-
clude those species. Both supporters and critics of the process have
suggested other changes that could lead to expanded use.37 Whether
these provisions are used, of course, will depend on the willingness
and ability of property owners to accommodate the needs of the spe-
cies with which they share their land.
Should all of these options fail, the ESA provides an exemption as a
last resort for truly "irreconcilable conflicts. ' 38 Exemptions can be
granted by a seven-member, cabinet-level committee, dubbed the
"God Squad," following an adjudicatory hearing and the development
of a complete record on non-jeopardy alternatives.39 Private parties
33. Charles C. Mann & Mark L. Plummer, California v. Gnatcatcher, AUDUBON,
Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 38.
34. Id.
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1988).
36. So far, only 150 plans have been submitted.
37. MICHAEL J. BEAN ET AL., RECONCILING CONFLICTs UNDER THE ENDAN-
GERED SPECIES ACT: THE HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING EXPERIENCE, WORLD
WILDLIFE FUND (1991); Robert D. Thornton, Searching For Consensus and Predict-
ability: Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21
ENVTL. L. 605 (1991).
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g) (1988).
39. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h) (1988).
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denied federal permits may apply for an exemption, but the standards
are strict and transaction costs may be high.' The "God Squad" has
convened only twice since the exemption process was created in 1978,
and on both occasions the applicant was a federal agency.41 Still, the
existence of the exemption process may constitute an administrative
remedy that must be exhausted before a frustrated permit applicant
may seek compensation for a taking.4
Another development that could have a dramatic effect on the
number of takings claims is the outcome in Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt,43 a case currently pending
in the Supreme Court. The question presented in Sweet Home is
whether the section 9 "take" prohibition applies to habitat modifica-
tion."4 "Take" is defined to mean, inter alia, "harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound or kill."'45 In 1975, the Fish and Wildlife Service
promulgated a rule interpreting the term, "harm" to mean substantial
habitat modification that actually kills or injures listed species by in-
terfering with essential breeding, feeding, or behavioral activities.46
This definition was upheld and enforced in Palila v. Hawaii Depart-
ment of Land & Natural Resources ("Palila r').47 The rule was then
"revised" and upheld again in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land &
Natural Resources ("Palla i/'). 48
In Sweet Home, a panel of the D.C. Circuit initially upheld the va-
lidity of the harm regulation. On petition for rehearing, Judge Wil-
liams reversed his vote and wrote a 2-1 majority opinion striking down
the regulation as ultra vires.4 1 Applying the obscure maxim of nos-
40. Applicants must prove that there is "no reasonable and prudent alternative"
to jeopardizing the species; that the benefits of proceeding with the action clearly
outweighs the benefits of alternative course of action; that the action is of national or
regional significance; and that it is in the public interest to proceed notwithstanding
possible extinction. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A) (1988).
41. The committee was first convened in 1979 to consider exemptions for Tellico
Dam and Grayrocks Dam. It did not convene again until 1991, to consider an exemp-
tion for 44 timber sales found to jeopardize the spotted owl. The author served as
counsel to National Wildlife Federation in the Tellico and Grayrocks cases, and as
Special Counsel to U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service in the spotted owl proceeding.
42. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172 (1985) (holding that land-use challenge was not ripe because owner failed to
apply for a variance); see also McDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S.
340 (1986) (land-use challenge not ripe because owner had sought maximum use per-
mit and still had the option of submitting a scaled-down project proposal).
43. 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 (1995).
44. Id at 1464.
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1988).
46. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1975).
47. 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
48. 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
49. Sweet Home, 17 F.3d at 1463.
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citur a sociis,5 ° Judge Williams found that Congress intended the word
"harm" to be limited to the "direct application of force to individual
members of a species."'" In a heated dissent, Judge Mikva attacked
the majority's reading of the statute and legislative history, and its de-
parture from the standard of judicial review52 announced in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defence Council, Inc.53 Should the
Supreme Court uphold the D.C. Circuit's decision, the regulatory im-
pact of the ESA on private property will be substantially diminished.
Assuming that Sweet Home is overturned and that Congress does
not eviscerate the ESA in the meantime, the questions of how takings
claims might arise and what arguments are there to counter them,
present themselves. Given that a facial challenge to either the statute
or the regulations would be extremely difficult,54 an "as-applied" chal-
lenge involving substantial economic deprivation based on reasonable,
investment-backed expectations would provide the best vehicle. Such
a case might arise in the "owl forests" of the Pacific Northwest where
logging on private lands is being sharply curtailed to protect the
"home range" of the Northern Spotted Owl; or in the San Joaquin
Delta of California where irrigation diversions must be reduced to
meet water quality standards recently set for the Delta smelt and the
winter run of Sacramento River chinook; or, on the outskirts of Aus-
tin, Texas where the golden-cheeked warbler sits in the path of urban
sprawl.
I. INVERSE CONDEMNATION/PHYSICAL INVASION
The clearest takings case is one where the government either autho-
rizes or commits a physical invasion. In Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 5
construction of a state-authorized dam flooded plaintiff's property. In
United States v. Causby,56 air traffic from a municipal airport disrupted
the chickens on plaintiff's farm. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhat-
tan CATV Corp.," the requirement that landlords install a cable tele-
vision box upon their property for the use of their tenants led to a
50. The meaning of a word may be "ascertained by reference to the meaning of
other words or phrases associated with it." BLACK'S LAW DicrIONARY 1060 (6th ed.
1990).
51. Id. at 1465.
52. Sweet Home, 17 F.3d at 1473-78 (Mikva, J., dissenting). A full discussion of
Sweet Home is beyond the scope of this Article, except to say that there is ample
reason to overturn the panel's decision.
53. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
54. Cf United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985)
("governmental land use regulation may under extreme circumstances amount to a
'taking' "); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981) (upholding the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30
U.S.C. 1201-1328 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
55. 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
56. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
57. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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takings claim. In the most recent case, Hendler v. United States,58 a
monitoring well was installed by the EPA to measure contaminated
groundwater. In contrast, the Court in PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins59 declined to find a taking where the invasion, requiring store
owners to permit individuals to exercise First Amendment rights, was
of a limited and temporary nature.
In some respects, Nollan60 and Dolan6l may be viewed as physical
invasion cases, although alternative grounds were also offered by the
Court. In both cases, the challenged government actions would have
required the owners to allow public access across their property. In
Nollan, it was beach access, and in Dolan, a bicycle path. The Court
emphasized that these actions removed one of the most basic "sticks"
from the owners' bundle of rights, the right to exclude others.62
Inverse condemnation will not play a significant role in cases arising
under the ESA. The ESA operates by restricting uses, not by requir-
ing physical occupation or public access. In one sense, it restricts own-
ers' ability to "exclude" the unwanted species, for example, a
marauding grizzly bear. However, in Christy v. Hodel,63 the Ninth
Circuit held that this restriction was not a taking. In similar fashion,
the Second Circuit rejected an argument by a Vermont ski resort that
denial of a land-use permit to construct a snowmaking pond in a deer
yard was a taking because it forced the company to provide winter
quarters for the deer.'
II. ESSENTIAL NEXUS AND ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY
In Nollan, the Court struck down a permit condition requiring the
owner to grant an easement across his beachfront property.65 The
Court based its decision on the ground that the condition bore no re-
lationship to the regulatory objective, which was to preserve a view of
the ocean for those traveling past the development.66 Interestingly,
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, indicated that if the California
Coastal Commission had conditioned the need for an easement on
access, and supported its position in the record, the condition would
have been valid.67 Form seems to have once again triumphed over
substance.
58. 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
59. 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
60. Nolian v. California Coastal Conim'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
61. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
62. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831; Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316.
63. 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989).
64. Southview Assocs. v. Bongartz; 980 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1586 (1993).
65. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839.
66. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836.
67. Id. at 836-37.
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In Dolan, the Court invalidated permit conditions requiring the
owner to dedicate a portion of her property to a public greenway and
bicycle path as mitigation measures to offset the additional parking lot
runoff and traffic that the project would generate.68 Writing for the
majority, Justice Rehnquist determined that, although the prevention
of flooding and traffic congestion were legitimate public purposes and
there was an "essential nexus" between these purposes and the condi-
tions, these conditions did not satisfy the "rough proportionality"
test.69 One reason the City of Tigard did not meet this test is that
Justice Rehnquist had just invented it. No one knows for sure what
the "rough proportionality" test is, but it appears to be more proce-
dural than substantive. All that may be needed is a good record to
show that the imposition on the landowner is proportional to the im-
pact the landowner is causing, i.e., that the landowner is not being
"singled out" to bear a cost that should rightfully ,be borne by the
public.
The essential nexus and rough proportionality tests will require the
government to justify both the efficacy and the equity of specific ESA
restrictions on specific property interests. However, this is not such a
bad thing, and it should not prove all that difficult. If these steps are
followed, neither Nollan nor Dolan should pose major problems in
ESA situations. Both cases involved actual dedications of property,
public easements, which are not required by ESA regulations
(although they may be agreed to in HCPs). The main message of
these cases is that rules appearing to force individuals to bear dispro-
portionate burdens to achieve the common good will have a tough
time passing muster with this Court.
III. CATEGORICAL TAKINGS AND BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES
Lucas70 is the most frequently discussed "takings" case in recent
history and certainly, it is the case that property rights advocates are
relying on to trump the ESA. In Lucas, the Court held that when a
regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive uses of the
land, compensation is due unless the regulated activity was not "previ-
ously permissible under relevant property and nuisance laws."' 71 At
first blush, this appears to be a reaffirmation of the familiar nuisance
or "noxious use" exception to takings. Beginning with the Prohibi-
tion-Era brewery case, Mugler v. Kansas,72 the Court repeatedly sus-
tained various uses of the police power on the principle that the
prohibited activity constituted a "noxious use."' 73 Later cases, such as
68. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2312-15.
69. Id at 2321.
70. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
71. Id. at 2901.
72. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
73. E.g., id. at 669.
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Agins v. Tiburon74 and Penn Central,7" expanded the "noxious use"
principle to uphold regulations that "substantially advance legitimate
state interests. '7 6 However, in Lucas, the majority opinion, effectively
rejected the Mugler holding, and sought to narrow the "noxious use"
exception to when there has been a "total taking."77 Justice Scalia
indicated that such severe limitations "cannot be newly legislated or
decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in
the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of prop-
erty and nuisance already place upon land ownership."78
The facts of Lucas are important to an understanding of this hold-
ing. In 1986, David Lucas purchased two residential beachfront lots
on a South Carolina barrier island.79 At that time, Lucas's lots were
not subject to the state's coastal zone building permit requirements
and the adjacent lots had all been developed. 0 In 1988, the state leg-
islature enacted the Beachfront Management Act which barred Lucas
from building any permanent habitable structures on his two lots.8 '
Lucas sued and the state trial court found that the new law rendered
his property "valueless.""2 The South Carolina Supreme Court re-
versed on the ground that the proposed development threatened a
valuable public resource and was akin to a public nuisance.83
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia deter-
mined that the South Carolina Supreme Court had been "too quick to
conclude that the [harmful or noxious use] principle decide[d]" the
case. 4 He elaborated:
[t]he "total taking" inquiry we require today will ordinarily entail
(as the application of state nuisance law ordinarily entails) analysis
of, among other things, the degree of harm to public lands and re-
sources, or adjacent private property, posed by the claimant's pro-
posed activities, the social value of the claimant's activities and their
suitability to the locality in question, and the relative ease with
which the alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by
the claimant and the government (or adjacent private landowners)
alike. 85
Justice Scalia acknowledged that nuisance law was an evolving con-
cept and that "changed circumstances or new knowledge may make
74. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
75. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
76. E.g., Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
77. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
78. I& at 2900.
79. Id. at 2889.
80. Idt
81. Id.
82. It at 2890.
83. IL
84. Id. at 2897.
85. Uat at 2901 (citations omitted).
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what was previously permissible no longer so."8 6 In a concurring
opinion, Justice Kennedy re-emphasized this point: "[tihe Takings
Clause does not require a static body of state property law; it protects
private expectations to ensure private investment. '8 Justice Kennedy
recognized the right of the state to go further than the common law of
nuisance to protect a "fragile land system.""8 The problem, as both
Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy perceived it, was that the state had
acted too late, as far as Lucas was concerned, in seeking to protect its
barrier beaches. The interesting question is whether the result would
have been different had Lucas bought the lots after passage of the
Beachfront Management Act.
Despite all the controversy surrounding the Lucas case, the actual
holding is quite narrow and leaves many undetermined issues. In ad-
dition to the one just posed regarding the timing of the alleged taking,
consider the trial court finding, which the state failed to challenge,
that the law rendered the property "valueless." Although four Jus-
tices (Kennedy, Blackmun, Stevens, Souter) found this finding ques-
tionable,89 the majority gratefully adopted it as the premise for its new
categorical rule.9" Where residual value is actually litigated, however,
such a finding should be extremely rare. Even the most severe envi-
ronmental restriction leaves some uses, if only recreational, so that
rarely, if ever, is the post-regulation value literally zero.9' Of course,
that begs the question of what, exactly, is the nature of the "property"
interest affected by the government action. This is the crux of the
issue under the ESA, and the next issue to consider.
The essential question is whether wildlife and ecosystem preserva-
tion are included within the "background principles" of state and fed-
eral law. History, logic, and the public interest all suggest an
affirmative response.
In its natural state, wildlife has always been regarded as ferae
naturae, a part of the commons rather than private property.92 Since
Roman law, government has been recognized as the trustee of wildlife
for the benefit of the public. For a time, states were even character-
ized as owners of wildlife.93 Modern doctrines imply that the states
86. Id.
87. Id at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
88. Id.
89. See id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2908 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting); id. at 2919 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2925 (statement of
Souter, J.).
90. Id. at 2896.
91. In Florida Rock, for example, the Federal Circuit held that evidence of a spec-
ulative market in Florida real estate must be admitted to determine whether, despite
the regulatory restrictions, there nevertheless were buyers willing to take the chance
that the regulations might one day be lifted. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States,
18 F.3d 1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
92. Cf. MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (1983).
93. Geer v. Connecticut, 151 U.S. 519 (1896).
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and the federal government share a strong parens patriae interest in
wildlife conservation. 4
Since the turn of the century, the federal government has exercised
its constitutional authority, under the Commerce, Treaty, and Prop-
erty Clauses, to enact a series of wildlife conservation laws.95 In Mis-
souri v. Holland,96 the Court upheld the federal waterfowl program
established under treaties with Great Britain and Mexico, and Justice
Holmes noted that "a national interest of very nearly the first magni-
tude is involved."97 Over the years, Congress has steadily added to
the corpus of federal wildlife law, including the Lacey Act,98 the Mi-
gratory Bird Treaty Act,99 the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection
Act, 00 the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act,1 1 the Marine
Mammal Protection Act,' and the ESA.
Wildlife protection measures frequently have been upheld in the
face of challenges from private property owners, objecting to prohibi-
tions on the take of certain species that totally eliminated an economic
activity. 10 3 For instance, in Kleppe v. New Mexico,' °4 the Court up-
held the right of the government to protect wild horses and burros
despite claims of damage to private grazing-rights holders. In Caep-
part v. United States,0 5 the Court enjoined the pumping of ground-
water on private lands, pursuant to state water rights, because it was
having an adverse impact on the endangered Devil's Hole pupfish. In
Andrus v. Allard,"° the Court prohibited the sale of Bald Eagle feath-
ers by Native Americans. In Cerritos Gun Club v. Hall,"°7 the Ninth
Circuit upheld hunting regulations that "totally destroyed" the value
of investments made on private land. And in Sierra Club v. Depart-
ment of Forestry & Fire Protection,°8 a state court upheld a California
agency's denial of permits to harvest timber on private land in the
absence of measures to mitigate harm to the threatened spotted owl
and marbled murrelet, despite the timber companies' contention that
the mitigation rendered the harvests uneconomical.
94. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332 (1979); California Trout Inc. v. State Water
Resources Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Cal. App. 1989). See also RUTH S. Mus-
GRAVE & MARY ANNE STEIN, STATE WILDLIFE LAWS HANDBOOK (1993) (listing 32
states with laws asserting public ownership of wildlife).
95. Bean, supra note 89, at 10-17.
96. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
97. Id. at 435.
98. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-78 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
99. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-12 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
100. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
101. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
102. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
103. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1892).
104. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
105. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
106. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
107. 96 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1938).
108. 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
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Another source of background property principles is the "public
trust doctrine," which is relevant to certain ESA cases. The value of
the public trust doctrine has been the subject of exhaustive debate.1 9
The doctrine continues to survive despite frequent notices of its de-
mise.110 Although largely a product of state law, the scope, content,
and effect of the doctrine varies from state to state."' One of the
strongest statements of the doctrine is the Mono Lake case," 2 in
which the California Supreme Court held that the state lacked the
authority to grant absolute water rights that would cause significant
ecological damage. The California Supreme Court rejected the "tak-
ings" challenge, determining that the appropriators could not lose
what did not belong to them."13
From the beginning, the doctrine has protected navigation, com-
merce, and fisheries." 4 Wetlands have been preserved in some
states,' 5 but not in others." 6 Over time, other interests have in-
cluded: wildlife habitat, water quality, recreation, and aesthetics. 117
Cogent arguments have been made for including the maintenance of
ecological integrity, whether terrestrial or aquatic, within the public
trust,1 8 but to date the Courts have not ventured much beyond the
high water mark.
IV. RELEVANT PARCELS AND PARTIAL TAKINGS
The two lower court decisions that pose the greatest threat of a con-
stitutional challenge to the ESA are Loveladies Harbor19 and Florida
109. E.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631
(1986); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
110. See James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a
Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527 (1989); James L. Huffman, Avoiding the
Takings Clause Through the Myth of Public Rights: The Public Trust and Reserved
Rights Doctrines at Work, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 171 (1987).
111. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 473 (1988) (states may "de-
fine the limits of the lands held in public trust and recognize private rights in such
lands as they saw fit"), reh'g denied, 486 U.S. 1018 (1988).
112. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d. 419
(Cal.) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
113. Id. at 452.
114. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
115. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7 (Wis. 1972).
116. Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n, 161 Conn. 24 (Conn. 1971).
117. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251 (Cal. 1971) (en banc); Kootenai Envtl. Alli-
ance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 622 (Idaho 1983).
118. See David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judi-
cial Protection of the Public's Interest in Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
311 (1988).
119. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en
banc), reh'g denied, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 28462 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 29, 1994).
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Rock,120 both opinions by Judge Plager of the Federal Circuit, involv-
ing Corps of Engineers denials of section 40421 permits to fill wet-
lands.: Loveladies Harbor involved a New Jersey developer who had
purchased•250 acres in the Meadowlands in the 1950s, long before the
advent of the state and federal wetlands programs of the 1970s.1
22
The owners had profitably developed 199 acres of the original tract
before applying for a state wetlands permit.'2 3 After a protracted bat-
tle, the state issued a permit to develop 12.5 acres, 11.5 of which was
wetland, but required the developer to dedicate the balance of the
remaining parcel, some 39.5 acres, to a conservation area.' 24 In find-
ing a taking, the Federal Circuit excluded all but the 12.5 acres in-
volved in the permit denial on the grounds that the original parcel had
been purchased before the wetlands laws were enacted, and that the
"relevant parcel" for purposes of analyzing the impact of the permit
denial was what remained to be developed at the time the permit deci-
sion was made, i.e., 12.5 acres.12 5
The Loveladies Harbor decision disregards the landmark Deltona1
26
decision, rendered by the Claims Court over a decade ago, and is in-
consistent with the approach taken by the Court in Penn Central
27
and Keystone," both of which held that in calculating the economic
impact of a regulation the "parcel as [a] whole" must be evaluated,
and if there is value in the unencumbered portion, no taking results.
However, Keystone was a close (5-4) decision with a vigorous dissent
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who argued that the affected interest (coal
deposits left to prevent subsidence) was a separate estate for which
compensation was due. There is some speculation that the Federal
Circuit may have been anticipating that, with the latest changes in the
Court's membership, Justice Rehnquist's view may become the major-
ity. Footnote 7 in Lucas hints in that direction. 2 9 However, since the
government decided not to seek to appeal the decision in Loveladies
120. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United.States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
121. 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
122. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1173-74.
123. Id at 1174.
124. Id
125. Id at 1181.
126. Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1017 (1982).
127. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
128. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987).
129. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2894 n.7 (1992). Jus-
tice Scalia stated:
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of all economically fea-
sible use' rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear
the 'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured.
When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural
tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation
as one in which the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial
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Harbor, it may be a while before we find out, and in that case, it
would be unfair to the newest members of the Court, Justices.Gins-
berg and Breyer, to prejudge their views on this complicated subject.
Florida Rock is turning into a wetlands soap opera. It has bounced
between the Claims Court and the Federal Circuit for over a decade.
The case involves denial of a section 404 permit to mine ninety-eight
acres of wetlands for limestone in a buffer zone area near the Ever-
glades.' 30 In its latest decision, the Federal Circuit reversed a key evi-
dentiary ruling by the Claims Court,131 and remanded the case with
the instruction that the lower court apply a "partial takings" analysis
to determine whether the company was entitled to compensation. 132
The partial takings test announced by the court is unprecedented and
radical, because owners would be compensated for the diminution in
property value based on their reasonable investment backed expecta-
tions of the profits to be realized from the prohibited activity. The
facts of the case illustrate how radical this approach would be. The
company bought the land for about $2000 per acre in 1972.133 Based
on the speculative market evidence that the Federal Circuit found
credible, the property has a current value of $4000 per acre. 34 How-
ever, the value of the limestone makes it worth $10,000 per acre.135
Thus, what the Federal Circuit is saying in its remand is that although
the property could be sold at a fifty percent profit, there may never-
theless be a taking because the company will not be able to realize its
maximum profit from mining.
The Federal Circuit acknowledged the lack of precedent for this ex-
treme rule of compensation, but cited footnote 6 in Lucas as a signal
from Justice Scalia that the Court may be inclined, someday, to adopt
a "partial takings" position.136 The Federal Circuit did acknowledge
that a "mere diminution" in value would not constitute a taking, but
gave no meaningful standard to measure what would constitute a
use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has
suffered a mere diminution in the tract as a whole.
Id.
130. The mining company initially sought a permit to mine the entire 1500 acre
parcel that it had purchased in 1972. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18
F.3d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995). However, the
Corps rejected the application, stating that it would only process a permit for three
years worth of mining, which meant 98 acres. Id. at 1563.
131. Id at 1565-67.
132. Id at 1573.
133. Id at 1562.
134. Id at 1563.
135. Id
136. In responding to Justice Stevens' comment that. the "total takings" rule was
arbitrary because owners who lost 95% of value would recover nothing while those
who suffer complete elimination of value recover everything, Justice Scalia remarked:
"[t]his analysis errs in its assumption that the landowner whose deprivation is one step
short of complete is not entitled to compensation." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. ai 2895 n.8.
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compensable "substantial diminution." 137 Judge Plager did suggest
that "[w]hat is necessary is a classic exercise of judicial balancing of
competing values," but the scales he describes have a heavy thumb on
the property owner's side. 138
In sum, there has never been a successful takings challenge under
the ESA, there are many ways of avoiding one, and conventional tak-
ings jurisprudence, though still in flux, does not suggest that ESA re-
strictions are especially vulnerable. In the vast majority of cases, ESA
restrictions do not even approach the total deprivation standard of
Lucas. Even in the hypothetical case of a total deprivation, an ESA-
based restriction may survive based on an analysis of background
principles of wildlife preservation and public trust doctrines. As time
goes by, landowners may also have difficulty demonstrating the rea-
sonableness of investment-backed expectations in the face of a grow-
ing body of scientific evidence and well-publicized accounts on the
subject of species endangerment and ecological impoverishment.
On the other hand, if the Court adopts either, or both, of Judge
Plager's reductionist theories from Loveladies Harbor or Florida
Rock, the future is bleak for endangered species, as well as for wet-
lands, greenways, open spaces, scenic vistas, historic and archeological
treasures, and virtually any other regulatory program that seeks to
protect natural or cultural resources on private land. By its very na-
ture, this type of regulation zeros in on a specific use of land and inevi-
tably removes whatever economic value can be gained through
destruction of that feature.
The reason regulations are created in the first place is to counter-
balance market forces that do not reflect, or respect, the values that
regulations seekto protect: biological diversity, ecological health, the
beauty and wonder of the world in which we live. These are difficult
choices. It is not possible to simultaneously maximize profit and yet
preserve biological diversity on the same landscape. Development,
good jobs and a decent standard of living are all attainable goals, but
long term sustainability, requires taking care of the land. Restraint is
essential. It is absurd to indulge every demand, consume resources
and dump wastes without recognizing the limits that the natural world
can supply and assimilate. One does not have to subscribe to fatalistic
scenarios to entertain doubts about the sustainability of a civilization
that is causing a rate of extinction unequaled since the time of the
dinosaurs. 139
In determining that property owners are entitled to compensation
whenever a government regulation substantially diminishes the value
of their property, as measured by the owners' expectations of the
137. Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1571.
138. Id. at 1570.
139. EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE (1992).
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profits to be realized from the regulated activity, Judge Plager is in
effect saying there is a constitutional right to eradicate species, even
entire ecosystems, from the face of the earth, regardless of the social,
economic, and environmental consequences. The rejoinder that all
government has to do to avoid this is to pay "just compensation,"
meaning "top dollar," is specious. How many billions would such a
program cost? Why should the public have to pay someone not to do
something harmful? And who in Congress will propose the first en-
dangered species tax? Let's be honest about it: if government has to
pay market value to get real estate developers to stop destroying
coastal sage scrub habitat in Southern California, we can kiss the gnat-
catcher and the rest of its biological community goodbye.
V. A WAY Our
Some of the complaints that landowners have about the ESA are
valid, and in fact are problems that impede the law's conservation
goals. The ESA asserts its role too late, when species have already
entered a freefall, crisis situation. Because the damage is already sig-
nificant, recovery takes time and the divisive conflicts resolve too
slowly. The HCP process is slow, unpredictable and too costly for
small landowners. However, these difficulties can be remedied
through carefully crafted legislative, administrative changes and of
course additional resources would help.
The most significant problem with the ESA is that it provides al-
most no incentives for private parties to want species to inhabit their
lands, let alone take affirmative action to conserve habitat. Nearly
everyone agrees that some package of economic incentives makes
sense. Ideas that have been suggested include a Biodiversity Trust
Fund, habitat mitigation banks, transferable development rights, and
insurance policies.140 The first, albeit modest attempt in this direction,
was a special fund established by Defender of Wildlife, a nonprofit
group, to compensate ranchers for stock lost to wolves.
Of course, like most good ideas, these all cost money. Some of this
money could be raised through fees and private donations. In some
cases, such as the Habitat Transaction Method being tried in Southern
California, 4' the development community may be willing to fund
market-based solutions as an alternative to spending their money on
litigation against the government. Other ideas, such as the Biodivers-
ity Trust Fund, which would finance measures such as conservation
140. See generally DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
INTO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (Wendy E. Hudson ed., 1993) [hereinafter
DOW Report]; Endangered Species Act-Incentives to Encourage Conservation by
Private Landowners: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environmental and Natural
Resources of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993).
141. DOW Report, supra note 140, at 27-36.
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easements, will probably require the dreaded "T" word, as in taxes on
real estate transfers or severance taxes on timber harvesting.' 42 As
unpalatable as such measures may seem, they may actually save
money and can honestly be seen as investments that will increase our
overall wealth over time.
CONCLUSION
Years ago, the late Professor Donald Hagman coined the term
"windfalls for wipeouts" to describe his proposal for resolving takings
conflicts. 143 His idea was that government should recapture some of
the wealth it creates through public investment; in roads, sewers, air-
ports, construction, that increase the value of private property served
by such facilities. This money, representing a portion of the "wind-
fall" enjoyed by the owner of the benefitted property, would be
placed in a fund used to compensate other owners whose property was
taken through inverse condemnation or regulatory action. In this
way, the "benefits and burdens of citizenship" could be spread more
equitably. Though never actually practiced, it was a good idea then,
and it may be an even better idea today.
It is infinitely worse to use the Constitution to batter the ESA, a law
that, although perhaps out of favor today, can serve well.
142. Id. at 101-07.
143. DONALD G. HAGMAN & DEAN MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS
(1978).
